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The Corporate Human Rights Benchmark: sparking a race to the 
top? Dr Chijioke Chijioke-Oforji1 
The Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB) has arisen amid widespread concern about the 
activities of transnational corporations in the global south. The benchmark, which is grounded on 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights—a global normative framework for 
responsible business conduct—assesses the performance of 101 publicly traded companies from 
different parts of the globe, against a range of human rights metrics and indicators. This article 
examines the structure and effects of the CHRB. It argues that the benchmark, although 
embryonic, can be characterised as a quasi-monitoring tool for the UN Guiding Principles. The 
article further argues that the benchmark has introduced a positive competitive environment for 
ranked companies to race to the top on Human Rights. This is reinforced by the considerable 
reputational and financial pressures that have been generated against poorly performing firms. 




1 The author is a Lecturer in Law at Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, United Kingdom and can be 





The use of benchmarks, rankings and indicators in transnational governance is expanding rapidly.2 
Notable examples include the Corruption Perceptions index published by Transparency 
International (TI) and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).3 Both 
benchmarks measure complex social phenomena – corruption and public sector governance – 
across several countries and quantify these ordinarily weighty socio-economic challenges in simple 
and accessible terms for end users.  
This growth in the use of benchmarks has attracted scholarly attention in the Global Governance 
and International Law disciplines.4 One example is a widely-appraised book by Kingsbury and 
others in which they note the normative appeal of benchmarks, rankings and indicators as 
‘technologies’ of global governance.5 Notwithstanding this appeal, the role, function and effects 
of benchmarks in the governance of socio-economic problems remain poorly understood.  
This paper sets out to address this gap. It examines, first, the idea of governance through 
benchmarks. Drawing from an interdisciplinary literature mainly within the social sciences, it 
considers the nature, characteristics, appeal and effects of Benchmarks. This is followed by a study 
of the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB) – an embryonic benchmark developed by a 
 
2 Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, Ranking the World: The politics of International Rankings and Ratings (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) p.8.   
3 Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry ‘Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators’ in Kevin 
Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry (eds) Governance by Indicators (Oxford University Press, 2012) p.1.  
4 Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry ‘Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators’ in Kevin 
Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry (eds) Governance by Indicators (Oxford University Press, 2012) p.1. see 
also: André Broome and Joel Quirk ‘The politics of numbers: the normative agendas of global benchmarking’ (2015) 
41 Review of International Studies 813. See also: Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, Ranking the World: The politics of 
International Rankings and Ratings (Cambridge University Press, 2015) p.8.   
5 Ibid at p.10.  
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multi-stakeholder coalition of investors and civil society organisations which ranks the 
performance of 101 publicly listed companies against six broad themes grounded on the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).  
The following section examines the design and components of the CHRB, positioning it as a quasi-
monitoring tool for the UN guiding principles. This is followed by an analysis of the discernible 
effects of the Benchmark and its potentially transformative role in inducing behavioural changes 
amongst its targets.  
II the Role of Benchmarks in Global Governance: An overview  
In an age of ever increasing interconnectivity in social, economic, political and cultural terms, 
benchmarks, indicators and rankings have emerged as useful instruments in the monitoring of 
complex social, economic and political phenomena.6 By ‘benchmarks’, this paper speaks of a wide 
range of comparative assessment or evaluation techniques often described in varied nomenclature 
such as rankings, datasets, indicators, indexes, external analyses that systematically assess the 
performance of actors, populations, or institutions against identified themes, outcomes, standards 
and metrics.7  
Notable examples include the Corruption Perception Index, published annually by TI – a civil 
society organisation (CSO), which ranks countries by their perceived levels of public sector 
corruption.8 The WGI, which ranks over 200 countries according to six governance attributes also 
fits comfortably within this paradigm.9 Other examples include the Ease of Doing Business Index 
 
6 Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, Ranking the World: The politics of International Rankings and Ratings (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). p. 7.  
7 André Broome and Joel Quirk ‘The politics of numbers: the normative agendas of global benchmarking’ (2015) 41 
Review of International Studies 813, 
8 Transparency International ‘Explanation of how Individual Country Scores of the Corruption Perceptions Index are 
Calculated’ (2017) 
<https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/explanation_of_how_individual_country_scores_of_the_corru
ption_perceptions> Accessed 20 May 2019.  
9 World Bank ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’ (2019) <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home> 
Accessed 20 May 2019.  
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of the World Bank10 and the subject-matter of this paper, the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark 
which ranks the performance of 101 Corporate giants against the six broad measurement themes, 
all of which are grounded on the UNGPs.11  
In studying benchmarks, it is useful to keep two broad analytical distinctions in mind. The first is 
the structural components of benchmarks, and the second refers more to the probable effects of 
these instruments.  
In the first instance, benchmarks share several structural components. These include the relative 
simplification of complex phenomena into clear, universal, objective and unambiguous terms.12 
From this vantage point, benchmarks are said to reduce complicated socio-economic problems 
such as corruption, public sector governance and corporate social responsibility into simple, 
comparable and accessible data for end-users, who include policymakers and increasingly, 
knowledge-based communities.13  
This simplicity is part of the central appeal of benchmarks because it permits the evaluation of 
phenomena that are by their nature extremely multifaceted, context-specific and in many instances, 
non-commensurable.14  
 
10 World Bank ‘Ease of Doing Business Rankings’ (2019) <https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings> Accessed 
20 July 2019.  
11Corporate Human Rights Benchmark ‘2018 Key Findings’ (2018) 
<https://www.corporatebenchmark.org/sites/default/files/documents/CHRBKeyFindings2018.pdf> Accessed 20 
July 2019. 
12Dolf Lintelo, Tamlyn Munslow, Rajith Lakshman and Kat Pittore ‘Assessing the Policy Impact Of ‘Indicators’: A 
Process- Tracing Study of the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index (Hanci)’ (2016) Institute of Development 
Studies Evidence Report No. 185, 12 
<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8fd9/854507dadb9c49d002395d4575c2cb1a533f.pdf> Accessed 20 May 2019. 
13 Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry ‘Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators’ in Kevin 
Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry (eds) Governance by Indicators (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
p.8. See also: Stefano Golinelli ‘Global Benchmarking Practices and the Development of a Progressive Art of 
Government: The Case of Land Governance’ (2016) Global governance/politics, Climate Justice & Agrarian/Social 
Justice: Linkages and Challenges Colloquium Paper No.36, 2 <https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/36-
ICAS_CP_Golinelli.pdf> Accessed 20 May 2019. 
14 Stefano Golinelli ‘Global Benchmarking Practices and the Development of a Progressive Art of Government: The 
Case of Land Governance’ (2016) Global governance/politics, Climate Justice & Agrarian/Social Justice: Linkages 
and Challenges Colloquium Paper No.36, 2 <https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/36-ICAS_CP_Golinelli.pdf> 
Accessed 20 May 2019. See also: Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry ‘Introduction: Global 
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Yet, the ease through which benchmarks simplify complex phenomena may also mean that they 
overlook context-specific peculiarities in favour of standardised or universal outcomes.15  Under 
such circumstances, contextual detail may be ‘lost in translation’ in the pursuit of quantification 
and comparability.16  While this may allow for a black and white view of the world, it also leaves 
room for criticism about the appropriateness, accuracy, neutrality, selectivity and bias of certain 
benchmarks.17  
Besides simplifying complex phenomena, another characteristic of benchmarks is their rhetorical 
appeal or force.18 This is borne out, often, in the title of the benchmark itself which is usually an 
indication of what the instrument purports to measure or assess.19 For instance, the Aid 
Transparency Index does exactly what its title implies – assess the ‘transparency’ of major 
development agencies.20 This is equally true of the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark which 
ranks corporate respect for Human Rights.21   
Rhetorical labelling of this kind serves two functions. First, it provides the benchmark with a 
distinct and separate identity from instruments of a similar purpose but, more so, it asserts the 
claim that the underlying phenomena exists and that the benchmark exists to measure it.22 This 
 
Governance by Indicators’ in Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry (eds) Governance by Indicators 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) p.8  
15 André Broome and Joel Quirk ’Governing the world at a distance: the practice of global benchmarking’ (2015) 41 
Review of International Studies 819,827.  
16 ibid. 
17 Sally Engle Merry ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance’ (2011) 52(3) Current 
Anthropology 83, 87.  
18 Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry ‘Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators’ in Kevin 
Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry (eds) Governance by Indicators (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
p.8. 
19 ibid. 
20 Publish What You Fund ‘2018 Aid Transparency Index’ (2018) <https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-
index/2018/> Accessed 20th May 2019. 
21 Corporate Human Rights Benchmark ‘2018 Key Findings’ (2018) 
<https://www.corporatebenchmark.org/sites/default/files/documents/CHRBKeyFindings2018.pdf> Accessed 20 
July 2019. 
22 Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry ‘Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators’ in Kevin 
Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry (eds) Governance by Indicators (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
p.8. See also: Sally Engle Merry ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance’ (2011) 
52(3) Current Anthropology 83, 84.  
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imbues the instrument with a certain intellectual or rhetorical appeal that is ultimately conveyed to 
end-users.23   
Alongside the above, benchmarks also possess a rank-ordered or what Kingsbury and others 
describe as an ordinal structure.24 Ordinal, in this context, refers to the positioning of the subjects 
of the benchmark in an order of magnitude, significance or importance.25 This is commonplace in 
many influential benchmarks where leaders are typically represented at the apex whilst laggards are 
placed at the bottom. Such ordering permits the ranking or comparison of the target actors against 
the underlying metrics or standards that have informed the benchmark.26  
A final component or characteristic of benchmarks is their purpose as evaluative instruments. 
‘Evaluative’ in this context means that benchmarks set standards against which performance is to 
be measured.27 The standards in question are typically suggested by the title of the benchmark – 
corruption, human rights, respect for the rule of law, etc.28 To the extent that a benchmark is used 
to evaluate performance against a given standard rather than another, the use of that benchmark 
embodies a theoretical claim about the superiority of the underlying standard in evaluating actors’ 
conduct.29  
Having considered the structural components of Benchmarks, it is important to analyse their 
probable effects. Here, the literature speaks of at least, two interrelated effects: knowledge, and 
governance or regulatory effects.  
 
23 ibid.  
24 Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry ‘Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance’ (2012) 
46(1) Law and Society Review 71, 76.  
25 ibid.  
26 Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry ‘Introduction: Global Governance by Indicators’ in Kevin 
Davis, Benedict Kingsbury and Sally Engle Merry (eds) Governance by Indicators (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
p.8. 
27 ibid at 9.  
28 ibid.  
29 ibid.  
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Scholarship of a largely Foucaldian and constructivist nature suggests that the most pervasive 
effect of benchmarks are their knowledge-based effects.30 These effects are central to benchmarks 
since they are, by definition, social constructions bearing specific logics, values, interests and 
knowledge claims.31  
The knowledge effects of benchmarks manifest themselves in several ways. The first is through 
the creation of identities and standards– determining, for instance, who is vulnerable and to what 
or who should provide solutions.32 The knowledge-based effects of benchmarks can also manifest 
through the creation of normative criteria regarding the parameters of appropriate conduct and 
performance.33   
These logics and knowledge claims may prove sensitive in areas of high public salience such as 
human rights, socio-economic development, corporate responsibility and corruption and can 
impel public authorities and other actors to respond affirmatively to the logics contained therein 
(governance or regulatory effects).34  
Besides unveiling logics and norms of appropriate conduct, benchmarks can also induce 
governance or regulatory effects. By governance effects, this paper speaks of the direct and indirect 
ways in which benchmarks exert regulatory authority and inspire affirmative changes on the part 
 
30 Stefano Golinelli ‘Global Benchmarking Practices and the Development of a Progressive Art of Government: The 
Case of Land Governance’ (2016) Global governance/politics, Climate Justice & Agrarian/Social Justice: Linkages 
and Challenges Colloquium Paper No.36, 3 <https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/36-ICAS_CP_Golinelli.pdf> 
Accessed 20 May 2019. See also: André Broome and Joel Quirk ‘The politics of numbers: the normative agendas of 
global benchmarking’ (2015) 41 Review of International Studies 813, 816-7. See further:   Maria Uribe ‘Development 
through data? A case study on the World Bank’s performance indicators and their impact on development in the 
Global South’ IRPA Working Paper – GAL Series No.5/2012, 13 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167366> Accessed 20 August 2019. See also: Sally Engle 
Merry ‘Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance’ (2011) 52(3) Current Anthropology 
83, 84.  
31 ibid.  
32 Golinelli n 29.  
33 ibid.  
34 ibid. See also: Leonard Seabrooke and Duncan Wigan ‘How Activists use Benchmarks: Reformist and Revolutionary 
Benchmarks for Global Economic Justice’ (2015) 41(5) Review of International Studies 887, 889. 
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of their subjects.35 This coheres with the argument of Uribe36 and Cooley37 who note that 
benchmarks often act as mechanisms for formal and informal global regulation by embodying 
values, logics and norms of appropriate conduct.38  
Regulatory effects of the kind described above occur partly as a consequence of the knowledge 
claims propagated by benchmarks but they are also reinforced by the financial and reputational 
pressures associated with benchmarks.39 Financial pressures typically arise where target actors 
stand a real chance of incurring serious financial or commercial liabilities and costs in the event of 
a dismal performance on a benchmark.40 In this sense, the benchmark may therefore act as a tool 
of ‘ex-post’ conditionality by linking the financial objectives of the target actor to a satisfactory 
performance on the benchmark.41  
One example often identified in the literature is the humanitarian policymaking sphere where actor 
performance on reputable benchmarks often determines the continued allocation of development 
funding.42 Financial costs of the kind described above are said to constrain the behaviour of target 
actors, nudging them towards better performance and behaviour (governance effects).  
 
35 ibid. 
36 Maria Uribe ‘Development through data? A case study on the World Bank’s performance indicators and their impact 
on development in the Global South’ IRPA Working Paper – GAL Series No.5/2012, 13 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167366> Accessed 20 August 2019. 
37 Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, Ranking the World: The politics of International Rankings and Ratings 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015) p.7. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. See also: Stefano Golinelli ‘Global Benchmarking Practices and the Development of a Progressive Art of 
Government: The Case of Land Governance’ (2016) Global governance/politics, Climate Justice & Agrarian/Social 
Justice: Linkages and Challenges Colloquium Paper No.36, 3 <https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/36-
ICAS_CP_Golinelli.pdf> Accessed 20 May 2019. 
40 ibid.  
41 ibid. See also: Stefano Golinelli ‘Global Benchmarking Practices and the Development of a Progressive Art of 
Government: The Case of Land Governance’ (2016) Global governance/politics, Climate Justice & Agrarian/Social 
Justice: Linkages and Challenges Colloquium Paper No.36, 3 <https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/36-
ICAS_CP_Golinelli.pdf> Accessed 20 May 2019. See also: Maria Uribe ‘Development through data? A case study on 
the World Bank’s performance indicators and their impact on development in the Global South’ IRPA Working Paper 
– GAL Series No.5/2012, 13 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167366> Accessed 20 
August 2019. 
42 Maria Uribe ‘Development through data? A case study on the World Bank’s performance indicators and their impact 
on development in the Global South’ IRPA Working Paper – GAL Series No.5/2012, 13 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167366> Accessed 20 August 2019. See also: Ole Sending 
and Jon Sande Lie ‘The limits of global authority: World Bank benchmarks in Ethiopia and Malawi’ (2015) 41 Review 
of International Studies 993-1010.  
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Alongside financial pressures, the regulatory or governance effects of benchmarks can also be 
reinforced by reputational pressures.43 Benchmarks induce such pressures through their status as 
symbolic judgements about an actor’s performance.44 For instance, a dismal showing on a 
benchmark is likely to pass a symbolic judgment about an actor’s behaviour including the propriety 
of the actor’s practices.45 This in turn, generates serious reputational or behavioural pressures on 
poorly performing subjects.46  
These pressures are likely to be amplified in areas of high public salience where activist networks 
may seize on the disconcerting performance of an actor in their often vocal campaigns.47 Indeed, 
Seabrooke and Wigan have argued that activist networks utilise the symbolic judgments of 
benchmarks in persuading poorly performing targets to change their practices and behaviours.48 
Under such circumstances, it is not implausible that benchmarks may in fact induce meaningful 
changes which may include serious improvements in culture, behaviour, practices and 
performance.  
III The Corporate Human Rights Benchmark as a Case Study.  
Having set out the structural components and effects of Benchmarks, this section examines the 
rise and nature of the CHRB.  
 
43 Stefano Golinelli ‘Global Benchmarking Practices and the Development of a Progressive Art of Government: The 
Case of Land Governance’ (2016) Global governance/politics, Climate Justice & Agrarian/Social Justice: Linkages 
and Challenges Colloquium Paper No.36, 3 <https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/36-ICAS_CP_Golinelli.pdf> 
Accessed 20 May 2019. 
44 Stefano Golinelli ‘Global Benchmarking Practices and the Development of a Progressive Art of Government: The 
Case of Land Governance’ (2016) Global governance/politics, Climate Justice & Agrarian/Social Justice: Linkages 
and Challenges Colloquium Paper No.36, 4 <https://www.iss.nl/sites/corporate/files/36-ICAS_CP_Golinelli.pdf> 
Accessed 20 May 2019. For a broader discussion on the idea of ‘symbolic judgements’ see: André Broome and Joel 
Quirk ‘the politics of numbers: the normative agendas of global benchmarking’ (2015) 41 Review of International 
Studies 813, 816.  
45 ibid.  
46 Leonard Seabrooke and Duncan Wigan ‘How Activists use Benchmarks: Reformist and Revolutionary Benchmarks 




The CHRB is, at its core, a unique evaluative benchmark birthed by a multi-stakeholder coalition 
of investors, and civil society organisations in 2013.49 Its main architects include notable investors 
such as Aviva Insurance plc, Calvert Investments, and the investment research consultancy, 
EIRIS.50 The CHRB also draws on significant civil society support and has organisations like the 
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre and the Institute for Human Rights and Business 
(IHRB) as part of its governing body.51  
Substantively, the CHRB is modelled on the norms enshrined in the UNGPs, which serve as a 
baseline standard for responsible business conduct across the globe.52 It aims to analyse the 
performance of major corporations on specific Human Rights issues, including their policy 
commitments, processes and systems for addressing key risks, responses to serious, human rights-
related allegations, and overall transparency.53  The benchmark therefore serves as a symbolic 
judgment on a company’s performance in the abovementioned areas. 
The companies, drawn from three industries – agricultural products, apparel and extractives – are 
chosen on the basis of their market capitalisation and revenues and are assessed across six broad 
measurement themes, each with varying weightings and mostly drawn from the UNGPs.54  The 
performance of each individual organisation across the measurement themes is then aggregated to 
produce a single ordinal score which can be up to 100 percent.55  
In assessing the performance of its targets, the CHRB relies on publicly available information 
about the human rights practices of its target companies. This includes information sourced from 
 
49 Corporate Human Rights Benchmark ‘Who we are’ (2019) <https://www.corporatebenchmark.org/who-we-are> 
Accessed 20 May 2019.  
50 Neil Hodge ‘Gauging Corporate Human Rights Performance’ (2015) 62(7) Risk Management 38, 39.  
51 Ibid. 
52 ibid. 
53 Emily Holland ‘Landmark Corporate Human Rights Benchmarking launched’ (Lexology, 28 March 2016) 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=41f18ac5-6e7f-4b5c-8a30-6898afadd52e> Accessed 20 July 2019.  
54 Corporate Human Rights Benchmark ‘Methodology 2018 for the Agricultural Products, Apparel and Extractive 
Industries’ (2018), 31-32 
<https://www.corporatebenchmark.org/sites/default/files/documents/CHRB%202018%20Methodology%20Web
%20Version.pdf> Accessed 20 August 2019. 
55 Ibid.  
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a company’s website, and periodic financial and non-financial reports. The CHRB also considers 
annual Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and sustainability reports.56  
In the absence of sufficient publicly available data, the benchmark may also consider external 
sources such as press articles, reports published by reputable data providers (Dow Jones, Vigeo 
Eiris, BHRRC and RepRisk), multilateral organisations, trade unions and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). Each external source used in the assessment is often shared with the 
concerned companies to establish its veracity.57  
The CHRB may also obtain data from confirmed sources within a target company where it seeks 
to assess the company’s approach to handling serious allegations of abuse (Measurement theme 
E). Where there are victim protection or confidentiality issues related to an on-going litigation, the 
CHRB may consider non-publicly available information, albeit on a case-by-case basis. Where it 
does so, it will indicate that this is the case.58  
(a) Key elements and methodology of the Corporate and Human Rights Benchmark 
As set out above, the CHRB ranks the performance of 101 publicly traded companies, from 
different parts of the Globe, against a range of indicators and themes based on the UNGPs.59  
Themes embedded in the benchmark include the governance and policy commitments of the 
benchmarked organisations, human rights due diligence, the existence of remedies and grievance 
mechanisms, the human rights practices of the ranked organisations, organisational responses to 
serious HR allegations and last but not least, transparency.60 The above-mentioned themes are 
discussed extensively in the following paragraphs. 
 
56 ibid at 33.  
57 Ibid. 
58 ibid.  
59 ibid at 31.  
60 Ibid at 31. 
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In the first instance, governance and policy commitments contribute 10% of the entire weighting 
on the benchmark. In this regard, the CHRB expects benchmarked actors to show multiple levels 
of commitment to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.61 Notable indicators 
here include company level commitments to respecting human rights and the rights of workers.62 
This is clearly based on the UN guiding principles, which also require businesses to respect human 
rights and put in place policy commitments towards this end.63 
Within the first theme, ranked organisations are also expected to show a public commitment to 
industry-specific standards and rights, including, respect for the rights of women, minors and 
minority groups.64 This is hardly surprising given the focus of the benchmark on the agricultural 
products, apparel and extractives industry – all of which are prone to issues of abuse and rights 
violations. Further indicators within this theme include stakeholder engagement65 and board level 
accountability on human rights issues among others.66  
The second theme considered by the benchmark covers the embedding of human rights into a 
company’s culture and management systems and the idea of human rights due diligence.67 This 
theme is so important that it contributes about 25% of the overall weighting on the benchmark.68 
Key elements under consideration by the CHRB include clear layers of responsibility for day-to-
day human rights functions, the integration of human rights into the risk management processes 
of the organisation and the presence of monitoring and corrective actions in the event of human 
 
61 Ibid  
62 ibid at 42 
63 UNGP 12 and 16.  
64 Corporate Human Rights Benchmark ‘Methodology 2018 for the Agricultural Products, Apparel and Extractive 
Industries’ (2018), 46  
<https://www.corporatebenchmark.org/sites/default/files/documents/CHRB%202018%20Methodology%20Web
%20Version.pdf> Accessed 20 August 2019. 
65 Ibid at 48. 
66 ibid at 49. 
67 Ibid at 54-55.  
68 Ibid. 
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rights abuses.69 Other indicators include the existence of processes and triggers for identifying 
human rights risks and impacts.70  
Alongside the above, the CHRB also considers the remedies and grievance mechanisms through 
which ranked companies address adverse impacts on human rights. As a sign of its significance, 
this theme contributes about 15% of the total weighting on the benchmark.71 Key indicators 
assessed here include the existence and operation of grievance mechanisms for employees, external 
stakeholders and communities.72 The CHRB also considers the involvement of stakeholders in the 
design and performance of the grievance mechanism.73 Other indicators include the commitment 
of target companies to non-retaliation over complaints and the transparency of the grievance 
mechanism among others.74   
The fourth theme contributes 20% of the entire weighting on the benchmark and focuses on key 
industry-specific risks. For companies in the agricultural products industry, the CHRB considers a 
number of indicators including payment of the living wage in agricultural operations and in supply 
chains.75 The benchmark also considers whether a company has taken active steps to eradicate the 
risk of Child and forced labour.76 Other considerations include freedom of association and 
collective bargaining for workers within the company’s operations and in its supply chains.77 This 
is broadly similar for companies in the apparels and extractives industry.  
The penultimate theme considers the practices of benchmarked companies with regards to serious 
allegations of abuse and misconduct. This theme is split into three different indicators. The first 




71 ibid at 67.  
72 ibid.  
73 ibid. 
74 ibid.  
75 ibid at 76-77. 
76 Ibid. 
77 ibid. 
78 ibid at 98-105. 
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CHRB also considers whether companies have appropriate policies in place for dealing with 
serious allegations of HR abuse.79 The third and final indicator in this context examines whether 
target companies have often taken appropriate action to address alleged HR abuses.80  
Last but not least is the important issue of transparency and reporting.81 The focus here is on a 
number of factors including a company’s disclosure practices,82 and compliance with recognised 
reporting standards such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board (SASB) or the UN Guiding Principle Reporting Framework (UNGPRF).83 The 
theme also considers whether the ranked company publishes key, high-quality reports that 
demonstrate an openness to Human Rights related matters.84 This theme contributes 10% percent 




80 ibid.  
81 ibid at 106-109. 
82 ibid. 
83 ibid. 
84 ibid.  
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Figure 1: Weighting of CHRB Measurement Themes 
(b) Analysis of the 2018 CHRB benchmarking exercise results. 
Based on the above-mentioned themes, the CHRB has produced ordinal scores showing the 
performance of 101 leading companies in the high-risk agricultural products, apparels and 
extractive industries. The results expose a rather disturbing picture of corporate performance in 
the human rights sphere.  
For instance, the 2018 benchmark records an ‘alarmingly low’ average score of 27% for companies 
ranked on the benchmark, an improvement of just 9 percentage points from the previous average 
in the pilot 2017 benchmark.85  Worse, nearly two-thirds of ranked companies score under 30% 
with over a quarter recording under 10%.86 Companies in this category include notable brands 
such as Costco Wholesale, Gazprom, Starbucks, Petrochina and Kraft Heinz among others. This 
represents shockingly inadequate progress seven years after the UNGPs were agreed and launched. 
Thematically, the benchmark finds a rather weak performance by a majority of assessed companies 
across the key measurement areas.  For instance, the benchmark records a low average score of 
2.9% out of a possible maximum of 10% in the area of governance and policy commitment, which 
suggests that a majority of companies are seriously behind in publicly demonstrating their 
commitments to human rights.87  
This disconcerting performance is replicated in the second theme which focuses on human rights 
due diligence.88 In this respect, the benchmark finds that an alarming 40% of companies score no 
points across the five indicators used to assess the measurement theme on human rights due 
 
85Corporate Human Rights Benchmark ‘2018 Key Findings’, 13 
<https://www.corporatebenchmark.org/sites/default/files/documents/CHRBKeyFindings2018.pdf>Accessed 20 
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diligence.89 This is despite clear expectations placed on businesses in the UNGPs to prioritise due 
diligence and to communicate their approaches transparently and effectively.90  
In respect of remedies and grievance mechanisms, the benchmark finds, on the one hand, that 
85% of companies disclosed information regarding the existence of grievance mechanisms for 
workers.91 However, 35 of these companies could not show that their grievance mechanisms 
properly extended access to remedy to other stakeholder constituencies.92 This is particularly 
concerning since the UNGPs explicitly require corporations to provide access to remedy for 
stakeholders as a whole.93  
On the transparency of grievance mechanisms, the benchmark finds a staggeringly low level of 
compliance, with only one third of companies explaining the process of managing grievances.94 
Also, a quarter of companies assessed did not disclose how they provide remedies to affected 
stakeholders where there are adverse HR impacts.95 This shows a serious chasm between the 
provisions of the UNGP and the practices of assessed firms.     
Still on the operation of grievance mechanisms, the benchmark finds that external stakeholders 
are much less involved in the design and management of grievance mechanisms. Indeed, only 17% 
of assessed companies provided details of some stakeholder involvement in the design and 
performance of their grievance mechanisms, with the remaining failing to do so.96 This is a clear 
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violation of the UNGPs which calls for the co-optation of stakeholders in the design and 
performance of company-level grievance mechanisms.97  
In respect of the fourth measurement theme which assesses specific company practices around 
key human rights risks such as child labour and payment of the living wage, the benchmark paints 
a chastening picture of corporate disinterest at best or nonchalance at worst. This is revealed quite 
starkly in the context of the payment of a living wage to workers within company operations and 
supply chains where the benchmark finds that ‘virtually no companies have demonstrated strong 
commitments to ensuring there are living wages paid to workers in their own operations and supply 
chains.’98  
This is worse in the context of child labour where the benchmark notes that ‘over half of apparel 
and agricultural products companies are failing to meet expectations on commitments to 
preventing child labour in their supply chains.’99 This represents, on the whole, a disappointing 
level of compliance with the basic norms enshrined in the UNGPs and other multilateral 
instruments which call for tougher corporate action on child labour and fair pay.  
A further area of concern highlighted by the benchmark is the practice of ranked organisations in 
responding to serious allegations of abuse.100 Here, the benchmark finds a rather limited, if not, 
unsatisfactory approach on the part of ranked companies. Of the 96 allegations reviewed by the 
authors of the benchmark, over a third were not publicly responded to and less than half resulted 
in meaningful engagement with alleged affected parties.101 Worse, only 3% of the cases reviewed 
showed the provision of satisfactory remedies to the victims.102 This suggests a profoundly weak 
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effort on the part of major companies in dealing with serious allegations of abuse and misconduct 
and in respecting the cornerstone principles of the UNGPs. 
The findings of the benchmark are not entirely negative: there are a number of promising signs. 
This includes the performance of major corporations like Adidas, Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton, Marks 
& Spencer Group, Unilever, Vale, ENI and VF whose leadership of the benchmark is clear to see. 
These companies all achieve above 60% and are ranked in this way given their good standing 
across the various themes of the benchmark. 103 
The leaders of the benchmark also show sound organisational practice across major measurement 
themes including those that require them to demonstrate policy commitments, embed respect for 
HR, provide access to remedy, deal with key industry risks and provide public access to key 
company-specific practices (transparency).104 This provides a silver lining and perhaps an 
opportunity for cross-organisational learning and improvements across the piece.  
 
103 ibid at 12.  
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Figure 2: Company Results by Band 
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IV Discernible Impacts of the Benchmark 
Having analysed the major components and findings of the CHRB, this section considers its 
discernible impact. At the centre of analysis are the obvious effects unleashed since the creation 
of the benchmark in 2017 and how these effects are shaping the preferences of ranked 
organisations.  
The first notable effect is the creation of values, logics and norms of appropriate conduct for 
corporations in the HR sphere. The benchmark achieves this through its status as the foremost 
attempt to assess the performance of major corporations against their human rights duties and 
obligations.105  
Alongside the above, the benchmark has also introduced a positive competitive environment for 
companies to race to the top on HR.106 This is borne out in the responses of a number of target 
companies following its introduction. In one instance, Nestle, a poor performer on the 2017 pilot 
acknowledged that there was ‘more work to be done.’107 The company also suggested that it was 
willing to ‘better understand… potential gaps.’108  
Another benchmarked company, Tesco, expressed its displeasure at its 2017 performance, noting 
that ‘the benchmark clearly shows that there is more we can do both in terms of our work and our 
reporting, and we will reflect on the benchmark… as we continue to evolve our efforts.’109  
The need for continuous improvements has also been highlighted by top performers such as BHP 
Billiton whose response to the 2017 pilot noted: 
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‘The results of the CHRB have been shared widely within BHP, including with the Board 
and the CEO. While the result is welcome, we are also conscious that our score leaves 
significant room to improve our human rights performance. We have therefore carefully 
reviewed the assessment to identify those areas where we may be able to improve. As part 
of that work, in FY2017 we established a Human Rights Policy and Practice Working 
Group… This group will propose a number of recommendations across the business from 
managing human rights risk in the supply chain, to the processes used to identify and 
manage human rights risk.’110 
The above remarks suggest that the benchmark has unleashed a positive competitive environment 
among its targets and that ranked companies are mindful of their performances and the 
corresponding need for improvements.  
This competitive environment has been reinforced, in part, by the financial and reputational 
pressures unleashed on firms assessed on the benchmark. Such pressure can be seen in the decision 
of Union Investment, a leading German investment group, to use CHRB data in engaging with its 
portfolio companies.111 The objective of this engagement is to encourage poorly performing 
portfolio companies to improve their standing on the benchmark by taking more affirmative action 
on Human Rights.112 Union Investments has also mooted the idea of ‘negative listing’ where poor 
performers are excluded entirely from its portfolio.113  
A further source of pressure is the efforts of investor coalitions following the release of the 
benchmark.  One example is the UNGP Reporting Framework Investor Coalition – a group of 85 
investors with over USD 5 trillion AUM – who are engaging proactively with CHRB benchmarked 
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companies on their approach to Human Rights.114 These investors have written to all CHRB 
benchmarked companies, setting out their expectations on human rights and requesting proactive 
action, including clear improvements on their CHRB performance.115  
There are signs that the competitive environment and associated pressures are changing 
behaviours and practices across the board. This can be seen in the improved performance of a 
number of companies in the 2018 benchmark. These include ENI, Adidas, Vale, Diageo and 
Danone all of whom score at least, 25% more than their previous scores in the 2017 pilot 
benchmark.116 The CHRB attributes this dramatic rise to the commitment of these companies in 
improving their performance across the processual elements of the benchmark.117  
More so, Coca-Cola – a poor performer on the 2017 pilot – has since issued its first stand-alone 
human rights report, partly as a reaction to the Benchmark.118 These examples support the idea 
that the CHRB is inducing change in corporate perception and understanding of their Human 
Right obligations and gradually driving a race to the top. 
V Concluding remarks 
This article considered the rise of benchmarks as technologies of global governance. It examined, 
in particular, the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB) a benchmark created by a 
multistakeholder coalition of investors and civil society organisations which assesses the 
performance of 101 publicly traded companies from different parts of the globe, against a range 
of Human Rights metrics and indicators. The article argued that the CHRB has introduced a 
positive competitive environment for companies to race to the top on Human Rights through the 
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creation of norms and logics of appropriate conduct. This is reinforced by considerable 
reputational and financial pressures that have been generated against poorly performing firms. 
However, if the CHRB is to remain an effective driver of change, a number of reforms may be 
necessary.  
First, the authors of the benchmark should consider broadening its scope beyond the extractives, 
agricultural and apparels industries to other sectors with a high risk of abuse. There are signs that 
the CHRB is taking this seriously given reports of the possible inclusion of the ICT sector in the 
2019 Benchmark. The inclusion of new sectors might therefore allow for a more perceptive 
ranking of corporate compliance with human rights obligations and enable concerned stakeholders 
to hold corporations to account.  
The CHRB should also engage more proactively with benchmarked companies to encourage 
discernible behavioural shifts. This could be formalised by way of an advisory committee where 
benchmarked organisations can reflect on their scores, share best practices and explain probable 
steps being taken to improve their performance. These steps and any organisational changes 
should then be disclosed publicly to keep a public profile of CHRB-induced change.  
The CHRB should further consider enhancing the impact of the benchmark by co-opting public 
authorities and regulators in its work. A potentially useful idea might be the use of the Benchmark 
as a screen in awarding public procurement contracts or in the provision of overseas investment 
finance. This should encourage a race to the top whilst providing strong public endorsement for 
the benchmark.  
Ultimately, the success or failure of the CHRB rests on its ability to create meaningful, long-lasting 
change in corporate respect for human rights. The initial signs are undoubtedly positive but 
achieving the long-term goals of the Benchmark will require a sustained commitment from all 
parties including the authors of the CHRB, its targets and stakeholders.            
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